Lacan y Merleau-Ponty, discusión y construcción. Una lectura de Pontalis

Abstract

Merleau-Ponty has tried to combat all irrationalism and therefore has had to enter into dialogue with a diversity of disciplines, pursuing an intentional and overcoming aim, in which human sciences and phenomenological philosophy can be reconciled and completed. In this sense he rejects the mechanistic or physiological postulates of psychology, but also distances himself from Freud's psychoanalysis and Binswanger's existential analysis. Pontalis recognized that Merleau-Pontyan’s phenomenology, unlike’s Husserl and Sartre, was the one that found the greatest affinity with psychoanalysis. However, despite rescuing certain aspects of its reading under the classical theory of Freudianism, he argues that the idea of ​​meaning leads to a subject that, while not defined as a constituent, does not stop being understood in terms of intentionality. The psychoanalyst also goes on to state that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of structure, considered from the gestalttheorie, would not correspond properly with the specific one of psychoanalysis. This premise reveals a reading influenced by the doctrine of the signifier of Lacan and allows him to discuss Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the unconscious as meaning and expression.